Azerbaijan’s Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) has responded to an article titled “Azerbaijan’s ‘Neither War Nor Peace’ Strategy Is Limiting Rapprochement with Armenia,” authored by Bashir Kitachaev and published on the website of the Carnegie Endowment’s Russia and Eurasia Center.

The AIR Center’s statement emphasized: “Unfortunately, it is not the first time the Carnegie has promoted a one-sided view of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations, whether during the period of active conflict or in the context of the current peace process. The Carnegie’s ideological rigidity has impeded a balanced assessment of developments between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In the same vein, the article in question advances the dubious argument that Azerbaijan has deliberately adopted an ambiguous post-conflict strategy, formally promoting peace while sustaining adversarial narratives toward Armenia for domestic political purposes. A closer examination, however, suggests that this interpretation rests on a selective reading of recent developments and an incomplete assessment of the legal, historical, and structural realities shaping the former Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict and the ongoing peace process between them.

The article attributes the persistence of adversarial narratives in Azerbaijani society primarily to deliberate political mobilization, yet it gives limited attention to the historical origins of these attitudes. In practice, residual distrust toward Armenia in parts of Azerbaijani society is closely linked to the experience of the First Karabakh War, during which Armenian forces occupied roughly 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory and displaced more than 700,000 people. Despite repeated demands by international institutions, including binding UN Security Council resolutions, calling for the withdrawal of occupying forces, the situation remained unchanged for nearly three decades. The conflict was also marked by episodes of ethnically targeted mass violence against Azerbaijani civilians, including in Khojaly, Aghdaban, and Bashlibel, which continue to shape collective memory and societal perceptions.

Returning to the article’s treatment of domestic rhetoric, the analysis focuses on manifestations of anti-Armenian discourse in Azerbaijan while largely abstracting them from their historical context, including the violence, displacement, and destruction associated with the First Karabakh War and the prolonged experience of displacement faced by Azerbaijani internally displaced persons. At the same time, the article pays little attention to parallel dynamics within Armenian society, where anti-Azerbaijani sentiment has also been present in political discourse, public debate, educational materials, and social media. This asymmetrical analytical focus narrows the scope of the assessment and risks presenting post-conflict narratives in isolation from the reciprocal nature of societal attitudes shaped by decades of confrontation.

In a subsequent section, the article suggests that references by Azerbaijani officials to “historical Azerbaijani territories” imply ongoing territorial claims against Armenia. However, Azerbaijan’s official position, repeatedly articulated by President Ilham Aliyev, has been that the conflict is over and that Baku does not maintain territorial claims against Armenia.”

The AIR Center also highlighted calls for amendments to Armenia’s constitution, which still contains references implying territorial claims against Azerbaijan.

“At the same time, a core concern for Azerbaijan remains the fate of more than 250,000 Azerbaijanis who were forcibly deported from the Armenian SSR between 1988 and 1992. International legal instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Refugee Convention, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, affirm the right of return, and Azerbaijan has indicated its readiness to support the realization of these rights within a broader peace framework,” it was stated.

Noting that despite having been the party subjected to occupation for many years, it was Azerbaijan that initiated the peace process after the Second Karabakh War by proposing five peace principles fully consistent with international law, the Center emphasized: “The year 2025 marked a series of milestone developments in the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, creating a realistic foundation for longterm stability in the South Caucasus. As emphasized in the Washington Declaration, the transition from negotiated texts to a durable peace requires further practical steps leading to the signing and ratification of the agreement. From Baku’s perspective, achieving sustainable peace necessitates addressing the institutional remnants of the past conflict, an approach reflected in Azerbaijan’s call for constitutional amendments in Armenia that would eliminate references implying territorial claims.

In practical terms, Azerbaijan has authorized the transit of Kazakhstani and Russian grain through its territory to Armenia, an arrangement that did not exist during the three decades of conflict. In a further unprecedented step, Baku recently facilitated the delivery of petroleum products to Armenia via Georgia, signaling a readiness to advance normalization through concrete, confidence-enhancing actions.

A review of several op-eds and research publications demonstrate that some of these assessments and predictions have not been borne out by subsequent developments. Despite this record, the Carnegie has declined to engage in substantive dialogue on these issues, including in response to outreach efforts by the AIR Center.”